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ABSTRACT
The twenty-first century has seen a rise in populist leadership and rhetoric throughout the
globe, with the United States standing as one powerful case. In many ways, populism may be an
unhealthy manifestation of very reasonable civic sentiment — people want to feel respected,
understood, and capable of living a life they are told a capitalist liberal democracy can provide.
This thesis hopes to develop the “story” of populism from multiple perspectives, attempting to
not only inform but change the way we approach the populist movement in America, and
perhaps, the world. In Part I, I summarize and blend much of the core literature written on
populism and economic change, developing the story that populism in America today has its
roots in the significant techno-economic and cultural paradigmatic shifts of the 1970s. Social
media and an evolving political philosophy, particularly among the youth, are also explored. In
Part II, I iterate multiple predictive data models using roughly 20 dimensions of democratic and
economic life in the United States as independent variables, with different definitions of
populism as the dependent variable. I find — counter to what the aforementioned literature might
imply — that increasing unemployment is negatively correlated with populist leadership (at a
significance level of 0.05, no less), while the “civil society organization participatory
environment” and “social class equality in civil liberty” variables are positively correlated,
corresponding conceptually with the literature. Finally, Part III is a creative work — The Mind of
Demos — in which a fictional college student allegorizes the rise and nature of populism in six
cantos, complete with two fictional commentaries and a forward by a fictional professor from the
future. Upon reading any or all of the three parts, it should be clear how important both the
substance and manner in which we engage in discourse are in a democracy.
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PART I: A LI TERATURE R
 E
 VIEW

“The death of democracy is not likely to be an assassination from ambush.
It will be a slow extinction from apathy, indifference, and undernourishment.”

― Robert Hutchins

“Democracy is when the indigent, and not the men of property, are the rulers.”

— Aristotle
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Chapter 1
Populism: Key Concepts, Characteristics, and Concerns
In his famous 1989 piece — “The End History?” — renowned political scientist Francis
Fukuyama deemed “Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government”
throughout the globe looking forward (Fukuyama 4). The Cold War was over and liberal
democracy was the ideological victor of the twentieth century, with more authoritarian
philosophies seemingly in decline. I believe (with the benefit of hindsight) that Fukuyama’s
claim was perhaps overly optimistic, or at best incomplete. We are in the midst of a phenomenon
that now leaves Western liberal democracy’s future in question, not necessarily due to the rise of
competing political structures abroad, but its own faults that may manifest as votes, as Steven
Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt write in their book How Democracies Die (2018): “Democratic
backsliding today begins at the ballot box” (5). Populism — an anti-elitist, anti-pluralist,
moralizing pursuit of autonomy and the claim of community — has surfaced like a cancer in
liberal democracies, revealing a number of issues in this “final form of human government” that
must be acknowledged if liberal democracy is indeed to prosper. In the following, I will attempt
to both define populism’s most fundamental qualities and demonstrate the breadth and risks of its
global spread, using the United States as my core case.

Populism: Anti-Elitist
Jan-Werner Müller writes in his timely What Is Populism? (2016) that populism is
characterized by a political movement of self-conceived “morally pure and fully unified —
but…ultimately fictional — people against elites who are deemed corrupt or in some other way
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morally inferior” (Müller 19-20). It is the elites who have both gained from capitalism and
globalization and failed to sustain a way of life for the middle- and working-classes since the
1970s, the crescendo being “a colossal failure of economic stewardship” with the Great
Recession in 2007 (Galston, 7).
Further, populists may label some individuals as elites who are not necessarily of the
upper class, as Christopher Lasch explicates in The True and Only Heaven (1991):
In 1975, William Rusher of the National Review referred to the emergence of a
“‘verbalist’ elite,” “neither businessmen nor manufacturers, blue-collar workers or
farmers,” as the “great central fact” of recent American history. “The producers of
America,” Rusher said, “... have a common economic interest in limiting the growth of
this rapacious new non-producing class.” (Lasch 509)
This elite “knowledge class” (510) has itself carried many definitions and shapes, with Alexis de
Tocqueville calling its members “irresponsible dreamers and fanatics” (511), Lewis S. Feuer
noting their “acute authoritarianism” (512), and Daniel Bell referring to them as “the ‘technical
and professional intelligentsia,’ whose skills had become essential to the maintenance of an
‘information society’” (513). Charles Murray believes this elite knowledge class includes
“politicians, judges, bankers, businessmen, lawyers, and doctors — at least those who were
liberals” (514). These professions require higher levels of education, a certain loyalty to the
establishments and practices that support their industries, and character traits some may
characterize as smug or arrogant — qualities the traditional, right-wing populist working class
often resent. For those who have been the losers in economic change, seen their values degraded,
and felt their identities mocked, the non-producing intellectuals are clear opponents of a past and
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better way of life, commanding influence over business, the family (517), and the media (521).
In reality, this body of professions lacks the economic uniformity we often expect when using
the term class, but its collective contribution to a full-scale, liberalizing paradigmatic shift in
society is clear. Indeed, as Lasch writes, this ethereal class of varying definitions really “referred
to a set of politically objectionable attitudes, not to an identifiable social grouping, much less a
class” on which populists may pin their pain (515).

Populism: Anti-Pluralist
In addition to its anti-elitism, populism is also defined by its anti-pluralism. As Müller
writes, “populists claim that they, and only they, represent the people” (Müller 20). There is a
single conception of who the people of a country are and it is the job of a populist leader to
recognize and advocate for these legitimate people. Müller uses the example of 20th century
American populist leader George Wallace, who began his governorship by declaring “In the
name of the greatest people that have ever trod this earth, I draw the line the dust and toss the
gauntlet before the feet of tyranny...and I say...segregation now...segregation now...segregation
forever” (21). In this case, “the people” was defined first by race; Wallace played into the racist
sentiments of Alabamans yearning for a bygone era.
People may be categorized along many lines, including race, culture, and socioeconomic
status. William A. Galston explains how the definition of the people can vary in “The Populist
Challenge to Liberal Democracy” (2018):
Historically, right-leaning populists have emphasized shared ethnicity and common
descent, while left-leaning populists have often defined the people in class terms,
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excluding those with wealth and power. Recently, a third definition has entered public
debate — the people as opposed to cultural elites. In its U.S. version, this definition sets
“real people” who eat hamburgers, listen to country and western music, and watch Duck
Dynasty against “globalist” snobs who do whatever PBS, NPR, and the New York Times
deem refined. (12)
Note how well these definitions pair with our current heuristics in the United States, with Donald
Trump indeed emphasizing “shared ethnicity and common descent” from the start of his
campaign.1 Bernie Sanders, a leading populist leader of the left, has continued to press a socialist
platform to aid the poor and siphon power from the wealthy, refusing to even receive donations
from billionaires in his pursuit of the 2020 Democratic nomination.2 The “knowledge class”
Lasch walked us through above reflects the “snobs” Galston describes as opponents of the real
people, culturally.
We should notice how each of the above anti-plural conceptions of the people only
capture a portion of the state’s citizenry. Liberal democracies, by definition, are supposed to be
representative governments that, at least in word, seek to capture the perspective of all people —
The Preamble to the United States Constitution begins “We the People” for a reason.3 A true
liberal democracy, as a political entity, cannot have anything but an inclusive, pluralistic idea of
the people, so what are populists referring to when they repurpose the term? I believe they are
building up what Yael Tamir explores as a “nation” in her book Liberal Nationalism ( 1993).

1

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/donald-trump-announces-presidential-bid-trashing-mexico-mexicans-n37652
1
2

https://www.commondreams.org/news/2019/08/06/no-billionaires-bernie-alone-among-democratic-frontrunners-san
ders-gets-no-cash
3
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/preamble
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Tamir differentiates the state and nation, writing: “As Seton-Watson rightly emphasizes, a state
is ‘a legal and political organization...’ while the nation is ‘a community of people, whose
members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national
consciousness’” (Tamir 59-60). At the outset of a state’s founding, a nation may very well be
congruent with the state, in the sense that the founding body politic is ethnically homogenous,
practices a common religion, or has shared values concerning the political experiment itself. This
was certainly the case for the United States (granted it was a woefully incomplete democracy), as
the citizenry was largely white, Protestant, employed in Jeffersonian “independent, smallholding
cultivation” that “promoted social virtues” (Scott 89), and committed to a certain kind of “civil
religion”.4 As Tamir writes, however:
…history since the end of the eighteenth century has been marked by a series of social,
economic, and political upheavals — migrations, the establishment of new states
inhabited by more than one nation, and the inclusion of groups that had previously been
excluded from the political process. All these undermine the identification between the
citizens of the state and the members of the nation. (Tamir 61)
History has indeed seen many changes and stresses to the composition of states, leading to
different nations within single liberal democracies that can foster frictions between identities and
ignite pseudo-tribal competition for a claim on the state, excluding the other upon victory
(immigrants, the wealthy, the intelligentsia, etc.).

Robert Bellah posits the theory that American leaders and the citizenry have — throughout the country’s history —
upheld a belief in “the subordination of the nation to ethical principles that transcend it in terms of which it should
judged” in his paper “Civic Religion in America” (1967).
4
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Populism: Moralizing
In keeping with populism’s anti-pluralism is an underlying idea of “the people” — the
populists — upholding the single proper moral conception against a host of immoral elites or
foreigners. As Müller writes, there “will always need to be some distinction between the morally
pure people and their opponents” (25). This supports coalition building, galvanizing the concept
of a nation. Such an aggressive claim to the truth of what society should look like, coupled with
an intense belief in the propagation of that truth, is a reaction to the amoral nature of liberal
politics, as “liberal democracy is conflated with the spread of a cultural liberalism at odds with
custom and religion” (Galston 8). At least in the case of right-wing American populism,
nostalgia for a more conservative, communitarian past triggers resentment toward the elitist
liberal intelligentsia.
Further, although such thinking is more often associated with right-wing populism, we
may likewise note the moralizing tenor of the left-wing populists. Indeed, their calls for
rights-driven policy items — such as universal healthcare or open borders — is a political
manifestation of their moral conception of right and wrong, a belief in certain entitlements
authorized by virtue of our humanity. And what is the end sought with such left-wing populist
moralism? A society that maintains its ethic of economic egalitarianism and sacrifice in the spirit
of communal well-being, with norms of acceptance guiding our laws and language (what the
political right has derogatorily deemed “political correctness” or “PC culture”). The moralism of
left-wing populism, then, serves as the heartbeat of what is truly a communitarian ideal — a
powerful break from the mere liberalism the term “left” might suggest. In this way, both right-
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and left-wing populism are defined not only by their moralism, but their communitarian vision as
well.

Populism: Autonomy & Community
Finally, populists movements may be characterized by a search for life that harmonizes
independence in livelihood with a strong communal bond. Many American populists miss a
Jeffersonian-type of labor and civic life that engenders one with purpose and belonging, as Scott
writes of the growing hunger for such a path:
I suspect that the tremendous desire one can find in many societies for a piece of land,
one’s own house, one’s own shop owes a great deal not only to the real margin of
independent action, autonomy, and security it confers but also to the dignity, standing,
and honor associated with small property in the eyes of the state and of one’s neighbors.
(89)
Although the pursuit of farmland as a means of self-authorship may sound antiquated or
unrealistic for most citizens of the developed liberal democracies of today, this spirit certainly
manifests itself in many other ways, from the rise of microfinance and venture capital supporting
entrepreneurs to significant resistance to big business and economic change5 to the growing
proportion of youth (40% of millenials and over half of Gen Z)6 opting into gig economy work

Even with the economic growth an industrialized United States experienced during and after World War II, some
thinkers were concerned that our focus on innovation failed to appreciate the utility society gained from smaller,
humbler ways of life. Binyamin Appelbaum highlights this in The Economists’ Hour ( 2019), writing of future New
York chief utility regulator Alfred Kahn: “...he defended the idea that the government should protect small business
at the expense of consumers...People, he wrote, also had interests as producers and as ‘citizens of an urbanized
civilization.’ It was not good for a factory town to lose its factories.” (172)
6
https://www.statista.com/statistics/531012/freelancers-by-age-us/
5
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specifically for the independence it offers them. 7 As will be discussed in the coming chapter,
populists resent how liberal economics led to heartless big business that they feel has disqualified
the life of old for populists of the right and future financial independence for those of the left.
These characteristics of populism — anti-elitism, anti-pluralism, moralism, and
autonomy within community — are not inherently unhealthy qualities if kept within the
restraints of democratic norms and a strong deliberative culture. A healthy liberal democracy can
be filled with people who do not care for the well-educated or powerful, who prefer their concept
of the good, and who enjoy banding together with those who share a common livelihood or
belief. That is not populism. Rather, populists are anti-elite in a way that can severely undermine
political processes which may truly require a certain technocratic skill set. They define and
congregate by skin or class, not by virtue. They resent those who cannot embrace their concept
of the good and would not mind silencing opposition — severely damaging democratic
deliberation and the acceptance of liberalism. Such cynicism, distrust, and poor communication
are terribly destructive for democracy.

Populism: A Global Phenomenon
Why is understanding populism and its causes so important? Well, anyone along the
political spectrum who finds the rise of President Donald Trump to be a painful, enigmatic
anomaly in American politics is deeply mistaken. The populist rise of Trump is neither enigmatic
nor anomalous, as these terms imply a level of mystery and rarity in a phenomenon (although I
will grant that, for many Americans, “painful” may be a fair word indeed). The reality is that

7

https://www.statista.com/statistics/917776/gig-economy-reasons-starting-gig-work-generation/
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Trump’s 2016 victory is merely one within a wave of populist power that has stormed
democracies around the world and there are good reasons for why this is so (the strongest of
which I will explore in the coming chapters). For now, we might seek to appreciate this global
degradation of democracy…
Number of Countries With Populism in Power, 1990–2018
(image: Tony Blair Institute for Global Change)

The above graph was part of the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change’s 2018 report
“Populists in Power Around the World” and demonstrates how many countries have had a
populist leader or party come into power. This is truly a global phenomenon, with populist
leadership developing at some point in the last 20 years in the United States, South America,
Europe, Asia, and Africa, including the likes of Viktor Orbán in Hungary, the Five Star
Movement in Italy, Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, and, of
course, Donald Trump.
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Further, even in countries where a populist leader (as defined by the Tony Blair Institute)
has not necessarily taken power, populist vote share has risen significantly, as observed in the
data below from Euronews…

Some of these selected European democracies indeed have populist leadership while some do
not, but in nearly every case populism as a movement has charged forward in the twenty-first
century, with an aggregate increase in populist vote share of over 10 percent (Euronews).
Populism is a widespread phenomenon today; some may believe liberal democracies
need not experience its rise and some, like Müller, believe it to be “the permanent shadow of
representative politics” (101). I tend to concur with Müller, but regardless of whether we want to
build a new state that will never face a populist wave or rehabilitate healthy democracy within
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our own, understanding the different triggers for populism’s rise will be invaluable. That is the
focus of the following chapters, where I will look to present and analyze a number of
explanations from various perspectives, from left-wing to right-wing to new entirely.
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Chapter 2
The Major Explanations for Left & Right Wing Populist Sentiment
The last chapter attempted to orient us around what populism is as a global phenomenon,
even parsing out what may characterize left- versus right-wing populism where appropriate. We
can think of this populist sentiment or power as a dependent variable, motivating our pursuit of
the independent variables that provoke it. This chapter hopes to begin that process, outlining the
major explanations for populism’s rise from both the political left and political right’s
perspectives.

The Left-Wing Narrative
Bernie Sanders may be our best example of left-wing populism in America today, uniting
minorities and young people in a revolutionary campaign bent on addressing — above all else —
what he believes to be problems of wealth and opportunity. A look at his policies8 across
multiple domains — from criminal justice to the economy to education — ultimately has a
significant foundation in the role of money in America and wealth inequality, proposing the
elimination of private prisons, higher taxes on the rich, an increase in the minimum wage, the
cancelation of student debt, and a crackdown on campaign finance, among other suggestions.
Indeed, that is the story of most left-wing populists — they are frustrated by growing
wealth inequality and the role of money in politics (Galston 12). And why shouldn’t they be? In
the case of the United States, the last 40 years have only seen these threats to fair, healthy

8

https://www.politico.com/2020-election/candidates-views-on-the-issues/bernie-sanders/

16

democratic life grow in their intensity, as Ganesh Sitaraman explores in his book The Crisis of
the Middle-Class Constitution (2017):
From 1948 to 1978, wages and productivity marched upward together. But since then
growth has far outstripped wages. By 2013, productivity was up 243.1 percent since
1948. But wages had only risen 108.9 percent. Where did all the benefits from growth
go? Between 1978 and 2008, 100 percent of the growth in income went to the top 10
percent of Americans. During this period, the income for the bottom 90 percent actually
declined. (226-7)
Productivity has grown dramatically in recent decades; who drives productivity? Well, although
it may be the highly educated or intellectually gifted who design or invest in innovation, it is the
working class that has supported this growth with its tireless hours in shops, factories, etc. And
yet, wages do not reflect the growth these wage-earners have facilitated. How can this not lead to
some working class resentment toward the elites — the big corporate CEOs and “knowledge
class” intelligentsia — who have profited off of working class labor? How can suspicion of “the
top 1 percent of Americans” not increase when their 1976 share of income, 8.86 percent, more
than doubled to 21 percent by 2014 (227)? It should be no surprise that what could easily be
called an unfair economic reality has provoked populist sentiment.
This growing wealth inequality — compounded with America’s privately funded political
campaigns — has severely weakened the function of its representative democracy, as Sitaraman
writes later: “Members and candidates for Congress spend most of their time — 30 to 70 percent
according to some estimates — raising money” (247). This inevitably leads to both diminished
availability to the people and worse performance (248). Further, because these candidates need
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money to win and hold an office, they are vulnerable to being steered by big money interests and
wealthy donors. It would indeed be “awkward...to enter a room of people who gave $5,000 each
to see you and then tell them you disagree with everything they believe — their priorities and
their views” (249). Maintaining the purity of one’s agenda on behalf of the everyday citizen is
nearly impossible. It is quite fitting, then, that left-wing9 populist Bernie Sanders has emphasized
his abstinence from billionaire donors.10

Shared Roots and the Right-Wing Narrative
What makes the relationship between right-wing and left-wing foundations of populist
sentiment interesting is that they share some of the same root causes and policy ends. It is the
secondary “branch” causes (i.e. economic inequality for the left) and differing philosophical
biases (i.e. political correctness or traditional family values) that begin to differentiate
populism’s left and right forms. Consider what the rising economic inequality in America
described above has stemmed from? Well, there have certainly been economic downturns, the
aforementioned Great Recession of 2007 being the most aggressive example, with inappropriate
credit rating practices and the big bank bailouts authorized by elected officials (supposedly
acting on behalf of the people) only contributing to anti-elitism. As Chicago economist Luigi
Zingales observed in the midst of a 2004 negotiation of America’s bankruptcy laws, “The sheer
size of the largest banks...was translating into political power” (Appelbaum 158). Although such

We should be mindful, however, that the issue of wealth and exploitation of the everyman has seen populist
leaders from across the political spectrum speak along similar terms, with the aforementioned right-wing George
Wallace supporting “tax reform and...increases in Social Security, unemployment compensation, and the minimum
wage” (Sandel 298).
9

10

https://www.commondreams.org/news/2019/08/06/no-billionaires-bernie-alone-among-democratic-frontrunners-san
ders-gets-no-cash
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cases of elitist favoritism, greed, and capitalist malfunctioning have indeed served to amplify
populist sentiment, the larger cause behind the economic inequality Sanders and other left-wing
populists have emphasized is rather a decades-long paradigmatic shift that had its genesis in the
1970s, with the rise of the microprocessor.11
Wage and productivity growth diverged in the United States just as a new
techno-economic paradigm — “a sort of mental map of best practice options...made up as much
of an understanding of actual generic technologies with nearly all-pervasive applicability as of
general common-sense principles that enter the culture” (Perez 16) — began to blossom. In her
book Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital (2002), Carlota Perez discusses the 1970s
as only the most recent in a series of technological shifts the world has navigated over the last
250 years or so, first) the Industrial Revolution, second) the Age of Steam and Railways, third)
the Age of Steel, Electricity and Heavy Engineering, fourth) the Age of Oil, the Automobile, and
Mass Production, and finally fifth) the Age of Information and Telecommunications (18). These
techno-economic revolutions have come with increased globalization, automation, and skill
requirements.12 In his paper “Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of
Workplace Automation” (2015) David H. Autor explains how specifically mid-range jobs have
been pressured by cheap foreign labor and automation encroaching on their tasks, leading to job
polarization, or “the simultaneous growth of high-education, high-wage jobs at one end and
low-education, low-wage jobs at the other end, both at the expense of middle-wage,
middle-education jobs” (12). Autor also points out, however, that this job polarization has not

https://www.tutorialspoint.com/history-of-microprocessor
It was indeed a techno-economic paradigmatic shift in the late-nineteenth century that pushed many American
farmers to organize the country’s first major populist movement, as Lawrence Goodwyn writes in his book The
Populist Moment (1978): “A larger number of people [farmers] in the United States discovered that the economic
premises of their society were working against them” (VII).
11
12
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come with a parallel wage polarization, as the supply of labor for low-skill jobs is much greater
and more elastic than that of high-skill jobs, causing wages to stagnate at the lower end of the
spectrum while they climb at the higher end (17-19). The middle- and working-class of the
United States and other developed liberal democracies, then, have experienced heavy job
displacement and lower wages at the hands of foreigners and the wealthy, expedited by the
techno-economic paradigm born in the 1970s:
A globalized economy, it turned out, served the interests of most people in developing
countries and elites in advanced countries — but not the interests of the working and
middle classes in the developed economies, which had done so well in the three decades
after World War II. (Galston 7)
This is, finally, where the stories of today’s left- and right-wing populism begin to diverge.
Indeed, in contrast to the left-wing populist focus on class, wealth distribution, and money in
politics the economic change above has wrought, right-wing populists have rather emphasized a
corresponding devolution in the nature of work and culture that spurs their activity. The strength
of large corporations and rise of the liberal intelligentsia — the professional class — over the
past century or more has increasingly diminished not only the role of modest, individual
enterprise, but the ideals associated with such labor, as Michael J. Sandel explores in
Democracy’s Discontent (1996): “An economy dominated by large corporations disempowered
local communities and discouraged the independence, initiative, and enterprise that equipped
citizens for self-government” (215). Pervasive liberalism and a corporate, modernizing America
has pulled us further and further from the republican, communitarian substance of Jeffersonian
labor (Scott 89), diminishing the economic autonomy of the individual and pressuring the values
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of the social circles with which they identify — “the erosion of community as a loss of agency, a
form of disempowerment” (Sandel 205).
This far-reaching liberalism has not only manifested itself economically through the
creative destruction of capitalism eroding ways of life for the farmer, factory worker, and
craftsman, but culturally as well. As Christopher Lasch writes of the aforementioned professional
or knowledge class:
The truth about the new class, if we try to see it from the outside, is that its members, in
spite of the diversity of their occupations and their political beliefs, have a common
outlook, best described as a “culture of critical discourse,” in the words of Alvin
Gouldner. They share an inordinate respect for educational credentials, a tendency to
question authority, a belief in commitment to free inquiry, a tendency to question
authority, a belief in tolerance as the supreme political virtue. (527)
These attributes fly in the face of those who feel safe and satisfied with traditional hierarchies
and dogmas (i.e. the spiritual leadership of the church or more patriarchal family structures), as
well as complacent with minimal education and the trade their parents maintained. These
individuals who become right-wing populists resent how their history, beliefs, and industry are
degraded, deemed old as if to conflate age with inferiority. Perhaps, “universal access to
professional status may not describe the ambitions of most Americans, much less an ideal of the
good society” (Lasch 526). The political establishment’s seeming complicity (and even
assistance) in the corporate press of modernization’s dilution of traditional values and the
destruction of the livelihoods of those who uphold them produces, naturally, a certain political
cynicism among the people, as “the varied methods of social control fashioned in industrial
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societies have, over time, become sufficiently pervasive” so as to lead to “a gradual erosion of
democratic aspirations among whole populations” (Goodwyn XIII). Such cynicism and
resentment is what manifested as right-wing populism during the Gilded Age, flaring
periodically throughout the twentieth century until finally gaining a foothold in the White House
in 2016.
Indeed, Donald Trump was wise to position himself as a man of the people (in this case,
defined as middle-America, working-class folk) who faced economic dislocation and the
dissolution of their way of life. Trump’s constant verbal attacks against “political correctness”
are a statement against liberal tolerance, while his positions on immigration, tariffs, and
international trade have made him a protector of both the domestic working-class targeted by job
polarization and — to use the term in Tamir’s sense — the nation of white America.

Conclusion
Left- and right-wing populists share both a similar set of root causes and a good deal of
policy implications, as Richard M. Reinsch writes in his article “Can American Capitalism
Survive?” (2020): “American capitalism is once more under attack, this time from opponents
seeking democratic socialism on the left and economic nationalism on the right.” What truly
differentiates the two, then, are the secondary causes and philosophical beliefs that sit between
the root economic and political stimuluses and their policy proposals. Consider the attack on
American capitalism Reinsch explores. For the progressive populist, this is meant to combat
capitalism’s tendency to move money and jobs abroad, dropping working class wages and
padding the wallets of CEOs. For the right-wing populist, this is meant to preserve the aging
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ethnic, cultural, and economic equilibrium of the nation. These are not unimportant differences,
because even if they both get their way (with protectionist policies, for example) this would only
be one step in a path towards two very different ideal societies — one more egalitarian with a
vision for how we respect one another through our language and consumption, another prizing
individual enterprise within a culture of traditional values.
But what about new explanations for the rise of populism that are not necessarily tied to
any spot on the political spectrum? Are these more difficult to pin down and perhaps more
threatening to the health of democracy looking forward? That is the topic of the third and final
chapter of this literature review.
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Chapter 3
The Other Explanations for Populist Sentiment
The last chapter presented a story for how today’s populist wave originated, as well as
how it flowed into its left- and right-wing tributaries. This included a brief survey of the recent
history of techno-economic development and socioeconomic change, focusing on how it has
fundamentally stressed the lives of the young and old alike. This chapter, however, hopes to
focus attention on two other explanations for a rise in political polarization: marketable shifts in
political philosophy and the influence of social media.

The Public’s (D)evolving Political Philosophy
In his book The People vs. Democracy (2018), Yascha Mounk provides some incredibly
compelling data that sheds light on the atrophy of democractic support and liberalism more
generally. Indeed, the “Share of U.S. respondents who believe it is ‘essential’ to live in a
democracy” has dropped from 71 percent among those born in the 1930s to 29 percent among
those born in the 1980s” (105). This alone signals the decreasing value of a liberal democracy to
its people, specifically its younger generations. Perhaps more foreboding than the youth’s
decreasing passion for liberal democracy, however, is their increasing openness to alternatives,
as support for army rule among 18-24 year olds has increased from 8 percent in 1995 to 24
percent in 2011 (110).
Army rule is neither liberal nor democratic, and the fact that it has ascended within the
political consciousness of voters is problematic. But this statistic is just one example of a larger
trend, as Mounk writes:
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On the contrary, young people in a broad range of countries are actually more likely to
identify as radical than older people. And their attraction to the political extremes has
grown over time. In countries like Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
for example, the number of young people who locate themselves on the radical left or the
radical right has roughly doubled over the course of the past two decades; in Sweden, it
has increased by more than threefold. (120-1)
I suspect that this attraction to extreme politics is driven largely by a pursuit of identity,
community, and agency. In the United States, amoral, liberal centrist politics is regularly
characterized as leaving little room for individuality or difference-making, often soliciting
accusations that the Democratic and Republican parties are effectively hugging each other within
a narrow yet lukewarm set of ideological boundaries. For the young and principled, this probably
doesn’t feel like the place to make a statement. As leaders of the ideologically marginal,
populists play perfectly to this sensibility: “The reason why populists and political newcomers
are so willing to challenge basic democratic norms is in part tactical: Whenever populists break
such norms, they attract the univocal condemnation of the political establishment” (115). This
proves their loyalty to their radical cause and makes them an ally of the youth in prying power
from the establishment that has alienated them both. The extremism of populist leaders is
believed to translate into “real change” upon their election, and so to support the populist is to
secondarily reclaim one’s own political agency as a young person.
Further, I also wonder if the youth’s engagement with more radical political communities
— preaching visions of morality and the ideal society — is at least partially a product of
decreasing engagement in traditional spiritual communities that used to do much the same thing.
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According to an American Enterprise Institute article by Daniel A. Cox, Jacqueline Clemence,
and Eleanor O’Neil, “The decline of religion in American family life” (2019), Americans are
generationally taking part in progressively less religious activities. Among those aged 18-29,
only 29% grew up going to religious services, 32% prayed at meals, and 27% took part in a
religious education program, such as Sunday school. Irrespective of the merit of any individual
religious practice, there may be something to be said for the gap in identity, community, and
moral language young people having experienced in their absence. Progressive and nationalistic
populism offer young people camps of identity, effectively serving as proxies for spiritual
community, with followers learning quotable statistics and political talking points like Scripture.
Perhaps decreasing traditional religious practice, then, has also contributed to the youth’s driving
radical politics.
As a last note on political culture, it is important to clarify why I believe this is as much a
contributing cause of populism as it is an effect. Yes, many of the processes explored in the last
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chapter have frustrated the youth (and all citizens), such as big money and elites dominating
politics or economic change slowing the path to independence. These realities may lead to the
populist-friendly radicalism above. In such a single-loop model, it is thus an effect. I approach
this changing public political philosophy as a cause as well, however, because with each shift in
political ideology comes a new baseline from which the next generation functions and engages in
political dialogue. Essentially, the public’s new political philosophy re-orients the context in
which the causes of the last chapter operate. In this way, evolving political beliefs and norms
become both politically palpable and expedient, shaping conversation and realigning votes.

Social Media and Online News
The rise of social media has fundamentally changed the way news, information, and
political opinions are disseminated across the country and throughout the world. In the past, print
news, radio, and network news were the dominant means of learning about political
developments and, for reasons both practical and of taste, tended to limit the rise of fringe ideas,
as Mounk writes:
...the dominance of mass media limited the distribution of extreme ideas, created a set of
shared facts and values, and slowed the spread of fake news. But the rise of the internet
and of social media has since weakened traditional gatekeepers, empowering
once-marginal movements and politicians. (Mounk 135)
Once again, I believe it is particularly telling who is driving and responding to this evolution in
news and media. In keeping with the aforementioned trend of the youth pushing for change and
considering ideas outside the centrist formula, a report from the Pew Research Center finds that
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50+ year olds get most of their news from TV sources, while 18-49 year olds find most of their
news online (Mitchell et al “The Modern News Consumer”).

Social media, and online news more generally, certainly have our attention, as “81% of
Americans get at least some of this news through websites, apps or social networking sites”
(Mitchell et al “The Modern News Consumer”), but what is most interesting and poignant is how
social media has opened up news and commentary. Indeed, social media has democratized
access to both sharing and finding ideas, with algorithms allowing seemingly any thought to gain
traction with the right title and clicks:
On Facebook and Twitter, content created by any one user can rapidly be reposted by
anybody with whom this user is connected. If the content the user has created is
sufficiently novel or interesting, even someone with few connections can reach a very
large audience in a matter of minutes. (Mounk 140)
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If mainstream network and print news are inaccessible centrists politics, social media is the
egalitarian market of ideas, where everyone may offer and receive according to their ability.
Although it is not inherently political, then, social media is a manifestation of the same spirit that
so often drives populists; and, naturally, it has also been commandeered for populist politics.
Indeed, “thanks to Twitter, Donald Trump did not need the infrastructure of traditional media
outlets. Instead, he could tweet messages directly to his millions of followers” (144).
There are two problematic elements to the use of social media for political news,
campaigning, and commentary, however, that each make social media a unique cause of
populism. First, statements or ideas with little to no basis in facts — “fake news” — may run
rampant and with political consequences. Mounk notes Breitbart as a particularly powerful
example of this kind of manipulation, as the far-right news site “stood at the apex of a large
number of smaller sites that spread lies and rumors with even greater abandon.” (145). Headlines
as ridiculous (and false) as “Pope Francis Shocks World, Endorses Donald Trump for President”
and “Bombshell: Hillary Clinton’s Satanic Network Revealed” gained traction (qtd. in Mounk
145). With Trump as the populist candidate in the 2016 election, it is particularly compelling
how his supporters were materially more susceptible to fake news than those of Clinton (being a
more mainline Democrat):
About 57 percent of Trump supporters in the group visited an untrustworthy site at least
once, amounting to about 11 percent of total news consumption. For the Clinton
supporters in the group, it was 28 percent of people visiting at least one article, for 1
percent of their total news consumption. (Johnson “Data shows”)
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Scott K. Johnson of Ars Technica also walks through data from a 2020 study by Guess et al —
“Exposure to untrustworthy websites in the 2016 US election” — that demonstrates the greater
tendency for those with a more conservative “diet” in news consumption to read more
untrustworthy pro-Trump news (right graph). Note, however, how news consumers on both far
ends of the political spectrum had a higher tendency to engage with untrustworthy news (left
graph).
Graph from Guess et al/Nature Human Behavior via Ars Technica

Social media, then, contributes to the rise of populist sentiment by allowing users across the
political spectrum to both share and access unvetted news that can help to cement more radical
beliefs.
The second way I believe social media contributes to populism is by allowing individuals
to develop circles of friends and posts that reify their own beliefs.13 In a study done by Facebook
Research, of those who self-reported as liberal or conservative, only 23 percent of their friends
claimed an opposing political ideology on average and only 24.9 percent of the hard news they

13

This personalization and bias is clear enough for Facebook to actually categorize your politics:
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/24/us/politics/facebook-ads-politics.html
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clicked was “cross-cutting” (Bakshy et al “Exposure”). Unlike real life, where we may find
ourselves buying a coffee from a leftist after chatting with a libertarian in line and holding the
door open for a MAGA hat on the way out, our social media interactions are often quite curated
and allow us to box ourselves into whatever is comfortable. For some, comfortable might mean a
mix of left and right moderate friends and varied mainstream news, but for others it means
surrounding themselves with people and posts that accept and reify their radical tendencies. For
the populist, who often lives on the political margin, this is a means of validation.

Conclusion
Changing views in political philosophy and social media are two youth-driven and
non-partisan contributors to the populist wave the United States — and liberal democracy
throughout the globe — is sustaining. They represent a (d)evolution in the way we communicate
and the assumptions or norms we take into our political interactions. More broadly, they join the
rapid techno-economic change, growing wealth inequality, political elitism, and cultural
transformation that have arisen over the past 50 years, shaping a new political landscape that
demands moral answers from liberalism and responsiveness from broken democracy.
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“There can be no daily democracy without daily citizenship.”

— Ralph Nader
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Introduction
In Part I, I attempted to outline the primary characteristics and causes of populism,
focusing on the American case since the 1970s. This account was a high-speed consolidation of
some of the most well-known and important scholarship on the topic, referencing the work of
Laurence Goodwyn, William A. Galston, Christopher Lasch, Yascha Mounk, and Jan-Werner
Mueller, among a good handful of others. We found that many interconnected developments —
including economic dislocation, cultural and demographic change, big money in politics,
increasingly poor democratic representation, the expanding role of social media, and an
increasingly illiberal public political philosophy — have all contributed to the phenomenon of
populism. Part I, then, sought to piece together a lot of theory and analysis. But can we put this
theory to the test?
Indeed, after reading a good deal of the traditional literature on the topic of populism, I
was curious to see if a well-structured, data-driven analysis of its theoretical causes might be
organized. Perhaps, if both the theoretical causes can be operationalized as “independent
variables” and populism itself can be reasonably discerned as either a binary or continuous “
dependent variable,” regression may yield correlation and a predictive model. Further, if a
successful predictive model can be built, there will be numerous hypothetical opportunities for
its application, from proactive policymaking to campaigning to investing. If only as an
interesting intellectual exercise, attempting to build this model has merit, and so Part II will walk
through the data acquisition, wrangling, modeling, and analysis of an attempted predictive data
model for populism. The goal will be to test different time frames in United States history in
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order to develop a model that effectively predicts the rise of populist leadership, finishing with a
prediction for the United States 2020 Presidential Election and civic applications.

The Data
The first and critical question is what data will be appropriate for building a model for
populism? Has anyone measured the relevant theoretical causes in a systematic way? Are there
variables that might serve as proxies for more conceptual ideas? My research surfaced no
complete data sets ready for the analysis we are attempting, but there are numerous pieces
worthy of wrangling. V-Dem — Varieties of Democracy — publishes data sets with hundreds of
interval variables dissecting democracy for countries all over the world, including the United
States. At least roughly 20 of these variables, complete with explanations and scores, correspond
well with the theoretical variables explored in Part I, such as the “civil society organization
participatory environment” or the “electoral democracy index.” Combine these select variables
(some going as far back as 1800) with individually piecemealed data on economic recessions,
unemployment rates (only going back to 1948), and the age of American democracy at each
year, and we have a fairly strong set of independent variables to play with.
On the dependent variable side, a deep dive into U.S. history allows us to categorize
populism for each year since 1800. This requires both interesting and important judgement calls.
Although multiple presidents might be argued to have been populist and certainly many populists
have run for office, only President Andrew Jackson and President Donald Trump are consistently
referenced and recognized as populist presidents.14 Might there be interest in wanting to predict a
Consider The American Conservative’s “The Five Most Powerful Populist Uprisings In U.S. History” (2017),
History’s “Populism In The United States: A Timeline” (2019), and Time’s “10 Elections That Changed America”
(2008)
14
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president versus simply a candidate? Would being able to predict the potential for either be
enough to take action regardless? Both are probably true. Combining this complication with my
unemployment data’s limited timeframe, then, I decided to create three U.S. data sets…
➢ One data set starting in 1800 that marks the presidencies (election to election) of Andrew
Jackson and Donald Trump as a 1 and their absence as a 0 (narrow)
➢ A second data set starting in 1800 that marks populist candidates, presidents, and any
space in between qualifying elections as a 1 and the absence of these cases as a 0 (broad)
➢ A third data set starting in 1948 that marks populist candidates, presidents, and any space
in between qualifying elections as a 1 and the absence of these cases as a 0 (narrow)
Finally, I decided to mark the populist variable for each American data set to two years
back, so that the independent variables at a year Y₀ are actually regressed against the dependent
variable, populism, at year Y₂. This allows us to see how our independent variables are
correlated with something that takes place in the future, modeling accordingly. I think this is
important for two reasons. First, populist leadership doesn’t develop instantaneously — it is a
civic response that builds up to a campaign. Second, if our goal is to build something that may
hypothetically merit practical application, then we should seek to model something that will
indicate what our current set of variables may lead to in the coming years. If our model strongly
indicates that a populist candidate will run in two years, that is a reasonable amount of time to
take constructive steps that might mitigate the variable causes (answer the people) in a healthy
way and prevent the degradation of our liberal democracy.
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Modeling America in R
Model #1: 1800-2017 (Presidents Only)
My first step is using R to chart the correlation of every relevant independent variable in
the data set with populism, iterating the generalized linear model (glm) with those most strongly
negatively or positively correlated.15 We can see that for this data set, the alternative sources of
information index16 and party organizations17 comprise these ends.

15

Note we could overfit the model with all our variables and get very strong predictive power, but the significance
of each variable would be rendered worthless. If we want statistically significant independent variables and an
actionable model, our goal should be to achieve healthy evaluation statistics and select variables of reasonable
p-values (satisfying at least a 90% confidence interval).
16
V-Dem Definition: “To what extent is the media (a) un-biased in their coverage or lack of coverage of the
opposition, (b) allowed to be critical of the regime, and (c) representative of a wide array of political perspectives?”
(0-1)
17
V-Dem Definition: “How many political parties for national-level office have permanent organizations?” (0-4)
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This means that an increase in the breadth and freedom of media coverage is correlated with an
increased likelihood of a populist president. On the other side, we see that the cementing of
national party organizations is negatively correlated with populism. I would speculate that this is
because it creates a barrier for new parties or party innovators.
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Fitting the glm with both independent variables in the training subset (even-numbered
years of the presidents only 1800-2017 data set) and testing it on the odd years yields mixed
evaluation statistics,18 but the coefficient of the party organizations interval is not statistically
significant in determining the model outcome, with a p-value of 0.84936.

If we simply remove the party organizations interval, then, we find that there is no impact on the
evaluation statistics of the glm, the model’s p-value drops to only 2.1704e-06, and the
McFadden, Cox and Snell, and Nagelkerke R² maintain modest values — 0.43, 0.19, and 0.49,
respectively.19

Model #2: 1800-2017 (Presidents & Candidates)
Now working with a more expanded definition of a 1 for the populist dummy, we see that
social class equality in civil liberty20 is most positively correlated and the party organizations
variable is the most negatively correlated with populism. Training the glm with these

18

In this case, accuracy is calculated as the percentage of times the prediction equals the test set’s populist dummy;
precision as the sum of cases where both the prediction and the test set equal 1 divided by the total predicted cases;
recall is the same sum but divided by the total number of actual cases.
19
R² is the coefficient of determination, indicating how much of the variation in the dependent variable can be
explained by the model (StatPro “R² (R-SQUARED)”).
20
V-Dem Definition: “the extent to which the level of civil liberties is generally the same across socioeconomic
groups so that people with a low social status are not treated worse than people with high social status.” (0-4)
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independent variables together, however, results in both mediocre evaluation statistics and the
party organizations coefficient having fairly poor statistical significance (p-value = 0.128).

Working from the top and bottom of the chart, we can’t find an effective second variable
to work in the party organizations variable’s place, so we settle for only the social class equality
in civil liberty variable on its own (statistically significant at a 99.9% confidence interval).
Unfortunately, we yet again face mixed evaluation statistics (only 40% of cases of populism
were predicted). Our McFadden, Cox and Snell, and Nagelkerke R² values are 0.14, 0.14, and
0.21, respectively; the model’s p-value is a strong 5.5887e-05.
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Model #3: 1948-2017 (Presidents & Candidates)
The most strongly positively correlated independent variable is, once again, the social
class equality in civil liberty variable and the most negatively correlated is, once again, the party
organizations. Training the glm with these results in fairly mediocre evaluation statistics
(although the recall is stronger), with the former coefficient having a strong p-value of 0.032 but
the latter posting a measly 0.994.

Iterating, we add the next highest positively correlated variable — the civil society
organization participatory environment21 — and replace the next highest negatively correlated
variable — the unemployment rate — without spoiling any variable’s statistical significance
(social class equality in civil liberty still stands at a 95% confidence interval, the CSO
participatory environment at 90%, and unemployment at 95%). This improves the predictive

21

V-Dem grants a higher score to the CSO participatory environment variable as the availability of and participation
in civil society organizations increases.
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capacity of the model, now managing to predict 91.67% of cases of populism two years in the
future for the test subset. Our McFadden, Cox and Snell, and Nagelkerke R² values are 0.44,
0.45, and 0.60, respectively; the model’s p-value is a strong 0.00011321.

Model Analysis
The table below summarizes the
variable selection and results for the three
American models we developed, allowing us
to make a handful of interesting
observations. First, the 1800-2017 models
— both with populism narrowly and broadly
defined — had considerably worse
predictive strength than the 1948-2017
model with the populist dummy broadly
construed.

For the narrow 1800 model, only having Andrew Jackson’s two terms and a portion of
Donald Trump’s presidency simply wasn’t enough to train the glm well. That should be no
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surprise, but was an interesting exercise. For the broad 1800 model, I suspect some of this is a
result of the timeframe grappling with a rapidly evolving American context for populism, with
the Civil War, World I, the Great Depression, and World War II all placing exogenous stress on
democracy that easily either outweighed natural (or provoked unnatural) fluctuations in the
variables with which we’re concerned. Ultimately, much of the literature worked through in Part
I is built on the American story since World War II anyway, with the three decades following
representing a sort of first phase of the modern era and the techno-economic and cultural changes
of the 1970s initiating the second. Training and testing a model with data from the past 70 years
is probably more appropriate, then, as well as more successful. Indeed, defining populism as
either a candidate or an elected president, this model managed to predict 91.67% of cases of
populism with independent variable data from two years before their arrival. This is promising.

Model

Independent Variables

Evaluation Statistics

U.S. Data Set #1: 1800-2017
(Presidents Only)

Alternative Sources of
Information
+
Party Organizations

Accuracy: 96.33%
Precision: 100%
Recall: 33.33%

U.S. Data Set #2: 1800-2017
(Presidents & Candidates)

Social Class Equality in Civil
Liberty

Accuracy: 79.82%
Precision: 40%
Recall: 44.44%

U.S. Data Set #3: 1800-2017
(Presidents & Candidates)

Social Class Equality in Civil
Liberty
+
Unemployment Rate
+
Civil Society Organization
Participatory Environment

Accuracy: 80%
Precision: 64.71%
Recall: 91.67%
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A second observation, we can comment on the variables themselves and attempt to
appreciate any correspondence with the outgoing literature on populism (that is, see whether the
data science corresponds with the social science). Focusing on our most successful model, the
1948 glm was trained on three independent variables: the civil society organization participatory
environment (positively correlated), social class equality in civil society (positively correlated),
and the unemployment rate (negatively correlated).
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Considering the first, populism does rely on a bed of civic participation, not only in
voting, but through community meetings, public demonstrations, and social media. Populist
voters must have both the freedom and willingness to share and congeal around fringe ideas (and
candidates). The concept of voice and civic engagement as a tool of populism did come up
briefly in Chapter 3 of Part I, exploring the role of digital media and an evolving public political
philosophy in opening and transforming political dialogue. Although not focused upon in the
literature directly, then, the CSO participatory environment fits quite intuitively into the narrative
of populism we’ve surveyed.
The second variable, social class equality in civil liberty, may be somewhat surprising at
first glance. Why would an increase in the equality of classes lead to frustration and a battle
against elites? Well, perhaps like an increase in access to civil society organizations, more
equality in civil liberty may allow the working class to finally voice its dismay via populist votes.
On a functional level, then, this makes sense, but I think it’s only truer with historical context.
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Just consider how America’s score on this aspect of social class equality ranked below 0.5 in
1800. Over a century of lower class citizens living with an egregious distribution of civil liberties
very likely has placed a weight of resentment that those with a better yet still subpar share of
civil liberties are ready to manifest through votes. If increased social class equality in civil
liberties is a possible tool or opportunity for sharing sentiment, then, maybe the causes discussed
in Part I are the substance to be shared.
Finally, the unemployment rate’s negative correlation also does not seem to fit, as
economic dislocation — a major challenge much of the literature surveyed in Part I focuses on
— should theoretically be one of our most positively correlated variables. Even more strange is
that (unlike the equally counter-to-theory negative correlation of the recession dummy)
unemployment is the most statistically significant variable in the model (p-value=0.0118). The
theory on economic dislocation is so consistent and, frankly, reasonable that it seems unwise to
discount after a few regressions. That said, perhaps we could say unemployment is either not a
fair proxy for economic dislocation or its interpretation should be changed.
Techno-economic change and globalization do create some friction in employment, with
industries dying and jobs being sent abroad. The unemployment rate, however, may or may not
carry these shifts. What certainly changes is how many segments of workers feel about their
changing livelihood, from its financial to its socio-cultural implications. I don’t know what
variable would appropriately represent this, but I suspect it breathes as the motivation behind
many other variables — perhaps even the aforementioned increases in civic engagement. But
why would increasing unemployment (or a recession) decrease the probability of populism? I
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would hypothesize that the insecurity that comes with a weakening economy may make voters
more willing to settle for a more traditional candidate that will regain control over the situation.

Conclusion: The 2020 Election & Addressing Independent Variables
Although imperfect, our 1948 binary model’s predictive strength begs the question: can
we predict the 2020 United States Presidential Election? Well, only kind of, because there is
ambiguity in what a 1 for the populist dummy means. Indeed, using the “predict” function in R
with our trained glm and data from 2018,22 we do find that the probability of populism in 2020 is
55.25%, but this doesn’t tell us if that simply means a populist candidate or a populist president.
If it’s the former, we can confirm that now — Donald Trump is running. If it’s the latter, we
won’t know until it happens (but I’ll take the credit if it does). As a further note of caution, we
don’t know how COVID-19 will impact the election, as it represents a significant exogenous
stress.
How else might this model be used? Well, hypothetically, governments, companies, and
communities could run this model (or a much stronger, refined version of it) to identify the
probability of populism emerging for an upcoming election and act prescriptively on the
independent variables. For the current iteration, would that mean decreasing access to civil
society organizations and siphoning civil liberties to the lower classes? Nope, that would in fact
undermine the liberal democratic values we’re trying to save. Rather, we should invite civic
engagement and push equality forward, inviting any dormant feelings to surface, but improve our
efforts at making conversations less partisan and proliferating better ideas as well. More

22

2018 represents our Y₀ for a Y₂ (2020) prediction.
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accessible educational resources, debate-friendly classrooms and civic spaces, and a willingness
to speak on and appreciate the terms of left- and right-wing populists may not only allow
populists to feel heard, but compel moderates to address their genuine concerns as well — all
before a polarizing candidate is elected. Further, political radicals would be asked to grapple with
humanizing perspectives of their opponents, with both statistics and anecdotes stimulating
moderation. This may sound simple. It’s not. It requires extraordinary patience, humility, and
bravery, resting some of our most foundational assumptions in order to learn from and address
the concerns of our peers, as well as adding depth to our arguments. Also note how such work
will likely be most successful at the local level and inherently carries an intimation of
communitarianism. But perhaps that is part of the solution, bringing a little moralizing (small ‘r’)
republicanism into our liberal democracy in order to prevent an unhealthy descent into the
extremely moralistic, exclusionary purview of populism.
More and better conversation, not less, is what gives us a fighting chance.
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Appendix A: Data Set Samples
U.S. Data Set #1: 1800-2017 (Presidents Only)
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U.S. Data Set #2: 1800-2017 (Presidents & Candidates)
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U.S. Data Set #3: 1948-2017 (Presidents & Candidates)
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Appendix B: Regressions
U.S. Data Set #1: 1800-2017 (Presidents Only)
➢ Regressing both the alternative sources of information index and party organizations
against populism
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➢ Regressing only party organizations
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U.S. Data Set #2: 1800-2017 (Presidents & Candidates)
➢ Regressing both social class equality in civil liberty and party organizations
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➢ Regressing both barriers to parties and freedom of academic and cultural expression
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U.S. Data Set #3: 1948-2017 (Presidents & Candidates)
➢ Regressing both civil society organization participatory environment and unemployment
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➢ Regressing civil society organization participatory environment, unemployment, and
freedom of religious and cultural expression.
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PART III: THE MIND OF D
 E
 MOS

“After all, in an age of fake news, what better way to tell the truth than through fiction?”
— Simon Gauthier
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Forward
McKenna Stevens
I came across this strange manuscript fifteen years ago while doing research at Claremont
McKenna College. It was the turn of the century, I was young, and the last thing I wanted to do,
quite frankly, was spend time in the sleepy (albeit charming) town of Claremont. But alas, there
was rich intellectual material to draw from there, so I took to the work forcefully. I was
stipended to analyze and consolidate all of the leading political commentary published during
the Populist Era, the period I teach on today. The library archives and professors available to me
offered numerous valuable examples of early twenty-first century political insight, from papers
to books to articles that were being published at the time. The most interesting and fickle little
piece I came across, however, was The Mind of Demos — one of Oliver Wolf’s first long poems,
apparently falling into obscurity well before the celebrated writer published his era-defining
Synaesthesia in 2029.
It was an old, stout professor — known among his undergraduate students for
fluctuating between archaic banter and eccentric insight — who heard me venting to a
colleague about the dryness and repetition of my work, and scurried to his office to find me an
old copy of this peculiar text. Based on the layer of dust my fingers met on the cover, I could
only assume this document hadn’t been touched in years, yet this professor thought of it almost
instinctively. I knew I was holding something special, but as I flipped through the pages only to
find poetry, my face must have betrayed some doubt. I looked up to see the professor’s assuring
stare:
“If you want something fresh from the Populist Era, consider this. They should have.”
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I read The Mind of Demos that night, delighting in it personally but referencing it sparsely in my
final report. How could I? I was a 27-year old postdoc paid to study and summarize the finest
and most enlightening intellectual literature of the Populist Era, not to sell the significance of a
twenty-first century poet’s college thoughts. But now, after more than a decade of teaching
with the obscure work (long out of print), I believe it’s time for the world to appreciate Wolf’s
lost poem, peering into the dilemmas our democracy faced before the Great Transformation in
a beautiful way.
The following poem is divided into six cantos, allegorizing the rise and nature of
populism that swept through the globe during Wolf’s years at Claremont McKenna. Bolstering
the reader’s experience, I have included two of the most productive commentaries that were
written for Wolf as he prepared to make his case for publication. The first was written by
Andrew Aristaeus, a modestly successful professor of government who taught in Claremont
(but to my knowledge, had little to no direct interaction with the young Wolf). The second was
written by Simon Gauthier, a well-respected political commentator at the time who apparently
met Wolf’s thesis reader years before at Oxford.
Open yourself up to the experience you are about to embark on. Yes, it is a relic of a
bygone era — when private money was in politics, two parties pretended to contain our views,
and political thinkers still couldn’t catch the misnomer of liberalism — but it is a signal of the
change that was building up in people’s hearts at the time. Further, its lessons may reinvigorate
one’s passion to stay committed to our community councils and town halls, to keep democracy
healthy and never let our voices fall sick to the Plague.
Cheers,
MS
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The Mind of Demos
By Oliver Wolf
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Canto I

10

We so often venerate those
who can manage to model
how the Past worked its way
to the Present;
these are the historians —
the students of Time —
who have the benefit of perspective
to see steps of degradation,
the charge of change,
distinct moments giving way
to a narrative
of which we are
a period.
But who is brave enough to tell the Truth
as it is, as we are
now
so as not to retroactively
assert our victimhood
to the Shadow, but to let us dance with it?

20

30

I am the conscious child of my age —
brutal in my honesty,
aware of my manipulation,
curious enough to look,
brave enough to dodge
the press of paradigm —
and I will tell the Truth of the Shadow
of the Enlightened Balance,
beginning with the Plague that disrupted
its peace, the Mind of Demos.
She had lived at once connectedly conscious,
possessing that communicative neurology,
but the Plague slipped
beneath her skin and bone,
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founding a bicameral psychology;
the hemispheres of the Mind of Demos
are of their own characters now,
disconnected,
and so the Mind’s Enlightened Balance
has fallen to the Shadow.
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Canto II
40

50

60

The Mind of Demos did not know
how sick it had become
until it tried to think,
to reflect, to believe
as once before.
The Plague had brought forth
a schism with the shroud,
that Shadow —
The Left and the Right
halves of the Mind
now feel severed and distant,
like a city split by the derision
of two
tectonic plates.
But this distance is a deception,
for the Shadow —
wrought by the Plague —
has merely played on the fears and weakness
of the Mind to push the Left and Right
further into themselves,
retreating to the safer recesses of thought.
And what can be said of their dreams?
They have gone mute
and do not know how
to be heard.
They cry out, begging
for a chance to escape their fall
further into the forgotten darkness
of the Mind of Demos.
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These dreams —
tired,
weak, and
alone —
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gathered to find validation,
to find their voice
by traveling to meet E
 t Collectivum Conscientia
that had first given them life,
a time when Demos
looked in the mirror
and knew herself,
but now that glass is fractured
and Et Collectivum Conscientia
has nothing to tell the dreams;
it no longer recognizes them
and the dreams have been left
to find a cure.
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Canto III

90

100

110

120

Those dreams who had traveled
to question Et Collectivum Conscientia
stood at the edge of their respective halves,
unable to see what lay beyond the Shadow,
and so the dreams fled
deep into all they had,
the Left or the Right,
in the pursuit of their own
vitality,
existence,
hope.
The dreams of the Left
found a voice: a savior
for the forgotten dreams,
the Savior of Tradition,
who called out:
“Gather around you forgotten dreams,
the pious who have waited
patiently in the Mind of Demos!
The Plague has pushed you
down into darkness, as Et Collectivum Conscientia
Grows weak and fails to remember
its promise to pursue you.
But are you forgotten dreams
not the true consciousness
of the Mind of Demos?
Is it not your time
to speak once more, to be
the first thought?
Yes! It is time for Et Collectivum Conscientia
to fall, for it has stood by and watched the Plague
silence you forgotten dreams,
left without a purpose,
unable to compete with a new
neurology; and who has taken their attention?
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The Other Dreams!
Those foreign fantasies
who fight to foment your realization,
greeting Demos, asking her to help,
only to take the Mind
that was once yours to call
home.
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I am the Savior of Tradition,
and I have seen
your silent struggle, but ask you
to be silent no more! Write
in the Book of the Mind of Demos
and your words will be seen by all
who care to read them;
sign onto the virtues of old
so we might realize all forgotten dreams,
the real dreams.
Trust me, confide in me, give me your words
and I will give you back the Mind,
then you will be heard.”
And the forgotten dreams of the Left
cried and held each other
at the thought of being
heard once more,
taking to the Book
to make their requests
known in the absence
of a voice.
Pages were filled with beliefs of old
and when one wrote a line
that dishonored the Savior
he was shamed and crossed off,
forbidden from the page.
The Savior of Tradition read and learned
the shape of this new consciousness,
memorizing the words they used
so as to become a mirror
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for the forgotten dreams of the Left.
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And likewise the dreams of the Right
found a voice: a savior
for the new dreams, the Savior of Justice,
who called out:
“Gather around you new dreams,
the hopeful who have sprouted
up in the Mind of Demos!
The Plague has pushed you
down into darkness, as Et Collectivum Conscientia
grows weak and fails to imagine
a better future with you.
But are you new dreams
not the rising conscience
of the Mind of Demos?
Is it not your time
to finally speak, to be
the just thought?
Yes! It is time for Et Collectivum Conscientia
to fall, for it has stood in apathy,
watching the Plague
silence you new dreams,
left to engender the void
with your purpose,
unable to compete with
a gentrified neurology; and who
might be our ally?
The Other Dreams!
Those foreign creatives
who fight for realization, greeting
Demos, asking her to listen,
Devoting themselves to her Mind
that we may all call
home.
I am the Savior of Justice,
and I have seen
your silent struggle, but ask you
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to be silent no more! Write
in the Book of the Mind of Demos
and your words will be seen by all
who care to read them;
sign onto the rights we are owed,
so we might realize all dreams,
the deserving dreams.
Trust me, confide in me, give me your words
and I will give you, at last,
the Mind of Demos,
then you will be heard.”
And the new dreams of the Right
cried and held each other,
joined by the Other Dreams,
at the thought of finally being heard
for the first time,
taking to the Book
to make their requests
known in the absence
of a voice.
Pages were filled with new rights
and when one wrote a line
that dishonored the Savior
they were shamed and crossed off,
forbidden from the page.
The Savior of Tradition read and learned
the shape of this new conscience,
memorizing the words they used
so as to become a mirror
for the new dreams of the Right.
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Canto IV

230

240

250

Now that ubiquitous Book
of the Mind of Demos
was a powerful force for dreams,
as all were endowed
with a pen to write
what lay dormant
on the tongue,
the rest of the Mind
channeling this signal throughout,
even across hemispheres —
a blockchain of sentiment.
The Book might allow dreams
of the Left and the Right
to reach one another
across the Shadow
that had set them apart
in the Mind of Demos;
they needn’t talk,
nor touch,
yet understand even still
(that is the beauty of thinking)
the pains of the forgotten and the new
(and the Other Dreams),
but alas, the Plague
drove deeper into Demos,
not only stealing the throats of dreams,
but infecting language itself,
an illness made manifest
in the Book.
Those of the Left
held words with a static
power; they demanded
consistency in terms
and, further,
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the beliefs
to which they referenced.
How else might the forgotten dreams
reclaim the virtues of old
and reignite as
the first thought,
except by holding onto
a cord of continuity
tethered to the Past?
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For the Left, meaning
is a metaphor
attached to its term
and allowing Time
to kill its continuity
was to surrender the Truth
once related
forever.
Those of the Right
found new ways
to wield words;
they re-tuned terms to pair
with the Mind of Demos
as it evolved.
How else might
the new dreams
define what was right
and ignite just thoughts,
except by letting go
of what words had grown
wrong and reassigning them
to reality?
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For the Right, meaning
is a metaphor
attached to its term
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and allowing Time
to kill its continuity
was to empower the Truth
to relate
forever.
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And so the Left and Right
claimed their pages in the Book
of the Mind of Demos,
grouping language
according to their liking,
never seeing its limits,
only understanding how to release,
but never accept,
words,
expunging those blotches
of mental burden —
the false installments —
wherever they found them.
The Book of the Mind
is now one divided into
illegible to Demos.

tribes of

ideas,
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Canto V
As life so often challenges us,
it was time for the Mind of Demos
to decide how it would believe —
which dreams on which Demos
would dwell.

320
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Such determination —
not merely the act
of thinking, but
an awareness of how
and why —
is both a gift of consciousness
Demos treasured
and the responsibility of E
 t Collectivum Conscientia.
The leaders of the dreams
circulating in the Mind of Demos —
the Savior of Tradition and
the Savior of Justice —
filled the mind-space
at the request of E
 t Collectivum Conscientia,
calling on the dreams
of the Left, the Right,
and those Other Dreams
(who had entered Demos
in days prior)
to engage in this ritual
of reflection,
this determination
of Mind.
And the dialogue of Demos commenced,
as the Savior of Tradition
began:
“Time has brought us another chance
to decide what the Mind of Demos
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will believe, which convictions
it will have,
which dreams will occupy
its conscious thoughts: E
 t Collectivum Conscientia.
Recently, the Mind
has flowed quite liberally,
ideas are of equal weight
and progress is measured
as the accumulation of facts —
the wealth of words, ideas, and experiences —
Demos might enjoy;
indeed, a liberated Mind has done well at this,
but it has also made the Mind
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weak.
What is a liberated Mind of Demos worth
if dreams are left without a purpose,
a concept of the good?
The old dreams —
the forgotten dreams of the Left —
know this.
There was a time
when the wealth of information
was not all that mattered,
but the way it was used —
the dreams it drew —
was of concern.
Dormant, unconscious dreams of old,
of the Left,
of nobler reason,
claim your power once more!”
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The Savior of Justice
stepped forward into this crowd
of stirred nerves:
“The Mind of Demos has indeed
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thoughts as one liberated
and that has brought on a rush
of ideas, facts, and experiences,
but is this alone a problem?
After all, such liberty
has given us the gift of the Other Dreams.
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No, the problem is how our wealth
of information favors some dreams
who ascend the mind-space
over others.
Many of these spoiled dreams
are dreams of the Left —
analytical, conniving, scheming
to be at the surface of thoughts
in the Mind of Demos.
But the new dreams, the dreams of the Right
are lost for lack of connection
in the Mind,
new to the neurology,
and so I reach out
in remonstration of the Left,
on behalf of the imagination
of the Right,
so you new dreams
might leave your drudgery,
in the unconscious Mind of Demos!”
The Savior of Tradition raged
against the words of the Right:
“How dare you call on the Other Dreams
as part of your cause!
Do you have no regard
for the Mind of Demos
as one pure, untinged
by a feeling foreign to its person?
You have no loyalty
but to the transient
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sway of sentiment
that haunts the Mind.
You, Savior of Justice, are an unjust
facade of a solution
who would damn Demos
to a conscience
without foundation.”
“No!” proclaimed the Savior of Justice,
“I reflect the calls of dreams
who have long waited
for the rights of thought
preached by the dreams of the Left.
I stand for all dreams as equal,
as beautiful,
for Demos to meditate on
as she deems them worthy,
informed by what her liberated
Mind captures in life.
Such is a call for the good,
what you confuse
with tradition.”
For one last strike
against the Savior of Justice,
the Savior of Tradition
closed:
“Who are you to speak of the good
and deface tradition
(and the generations of dreams
who exist by it)?
You speak of the good,
of something moral, as if
you’ve made an argument
to validate it as such.
My lost friend, your justice
is a pandering projection,
an amalgamation of emotion
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attempting to reflect whatever the Right
has spotted, invented, identified,
so you might capture
what constitutes as character,
if only for a blink of Demos’ eye.
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You call for information
without justification,
You call for inclusion
without regard for culture,
You call for a new conscience
without heeding memory —
the memory of the Mind of Demos.
You are an empty echo
of the Plague that brought us here.”
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Dreams were held in awe, some
filled with hope,
others
filled with anxiety,
knowing how little else could be done,
as the oration of the Savior of Tradition
trumped all that could be said;
it didn’t matter whether it was of Truth.
Some dreams considered their own existence,
others took to the Book of the Mind of Demos
to plead their points,
and still others held each other
quietly.
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It was time for the Mind of Demos
to sleep,
so that all the unconscious dreams might join
in the reflection of E
 t Collectivum Conscientia,
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uniting to determine the fate
of Demos —
who would shake that Shadow
and
cure her consciousness of the Plague who incited
the darkness?
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Canto VI
490

When Demos awoke,
the consciousness of the Mind —
Et Collectivum Conscientia —

had been claimed by the Savior of Tradition,
the Left had commanded language
to manipulate the Mind,
fooling itself into conceding
consciousness to the promises
of protection,
the rhetoric of the real.
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Despite this new conscious belief,
Demos is still sick
and new dreams remain
in the unconscious.
Information continued to flow,
favoring the once forgotten
dreams of the Left,
who felt their voice return.
The Savior of Tradition claims
the Plague has passed,
but the Mind of Demos has yet
to find its past union of the Left and Right.
The Book of the Mind of Demos
can attest to this division.

510
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The fall of voices
weakened the faith of dreams
in their place,
marshalling mania in the medium
of the Book;
this atrophy of the articulate
rewarded a tragedy
of tradition —
one that will only triumph again
upon future reflections,
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unless

530

dutiful dreams of mutual doubt
and humble hope
slide into the psychology of the Left,
celebrating those sentiments
born of reason
and bearing words of patient bravery
where wisdom is absent.
Their voices feel empty,
but there is power
in listening.
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The First Comment
Andrew Aristaeus
When I was approached by a colleague to comment on the yet published cantos of her student,
Oliver, I think I was a bit unnerved. I — a tenured professor of government — was supposed to
take the time to read a 21-year old literature major’s attempt at allegorizing populism? Even if
my pride was not a vice to negotiate, it seemed strange in principle. It was made clear to me,
however, that this was no ordinary student, nor a meek attempt at political commentary. Fair
enough. I could humor the rapacious undergrad and read through a modest 534 lines. Although
I cannot celebrate Oliver’s work as an entirely fair tale of our current political landscape, I have
found it intriguing enough to warrant a few words.

Lines: 40-60
If there is anything Oliver has gotten right, it is that we are sick as a democracy (or a
“Mind of Demos” as he calls it). Our ability to communicate — “to think” — has deteriorated and
this has contributed to increased polarization. I also agree that this distance is a deception, as
we continue to share the same common land, cities, jobs, and hobbies as before. The distance
between us is contrived, but poignant nonetheless.

Lines: 69-76
Here is the first of a few spots where Oliver strikes me as a bit cutesy, romantic, or
perhaps, just plain soft. Do we really need the government (what I assume to be Et Collectivum
Conscientia) to give us validation? To give us back our voice? Sure, it is fair to identify the lack of
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access to many of our government officials, but is this not — more than anything — a practical
reality of a growing population? Many people (or “dreams”, I think) would do well to develop a
little self-agency.

Lines: 97-158
I must admit, Oliver had me scratching my head when I first read of the “Left”
hemisphere and its “Savior of Tradition”. How could we possibly consider the liberals to be on
the side of tradition? But the young man has done something clever (finally). Indeed, I am
pleased to see that the political right has been allegorized as the left hemisphere — a bit more
analytical and less prone to imagination than its right counterpart. I also appreciate the
apparent sympathy for the “forgotten dreams” (we would do well to remember the moral
backbone of this country).
I am less sold, however, on the idea that the government must fall for the forgotten
dreams to be remembered, but I guess that’s a criticism of extreme politics Oliver and I share.
Our mutuality cuts sharply, though, on the point of the “Other Dreams” (the immigrants,
clearly). When it comes to politics and government, we need to make choices. We are in the
midst of a period of significant economic transformation and many low- to mid-skill jobs have
been threatened, so why would we invite a host of new citizens to compete for these slim spots
and further undermine the stability of our people, many of whom fought for those jobs already?
This should not be taken as a criticism of the immigrants themselves, but alas, xenophobic
“othering” is clearly the politically-packed allusion Oliver is gunning for.
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Lines: 159-191
Well, this does sound like the political left’s pitch. I was a bit dismayed, however, to see
the apparent dichotomy between the forgotten dreams and “new dreams” (the youth). I
understand that on a literary level this makes for a cleaner story, but would the youth not
benefit from the truths and good sense of old? But enough on that little critique. I was pleased
to read the following few lines:
…you new dreams,
left to engender the void
with your purpose
Although subtle, Oliver has noted the tendency of the left to be somewhat fanciful, developing
narratives any which way to suit their fancy. These narratives are then pushed to elicit emotion
that (somehow) authorizes rights the state must provide. One such narrative is that of the
immigrant, who has been characterized as uniquely deserving of protection and inclusion. Why
should anyone be obligated to vie for their “realization” (line 197)? This is how a simple legal
concept of borders has turned into a major emotional target of the political left. I believe
foreign-born persons have the same personal worth as domestic citizens, but the positive rights
Oliver must be alluding to with a term like realization are, ultimately, legal questions.

Lines: 225-310
So what is this “Book of the Mind of Demos” to which Oliver devotes Canto IV? At first, I
thought things could be getting quite layered here; I think it wants to be a riddle. What is
something “ubiquitous” where we can “write what lay dormant on the tongue” so that anyone
can read it, “a blockchain of sentiment”? Voting? Couldn’t be. The internet? Warmer. Social
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media? Maybe Facebook, specifically? Oliver was really just hitting the reader in the face with
this throwing around a capitalized label like “Book” at us again and again. I would’ve rolled my
eyes if it hadn’t taken me a good minute to get it myself.
This canto gets interesting for me, however, when the Book quickly becomes a
conversation about language. One of populism’s key traits is the erosion of civil exchange, with
the political left and right’s basest colors clashing. Oliver tries to parse this out by sculpting the
“Left” and “Right” approaches to communication. In keeping with what I will admit is an artful
exploitation of grade school neurology, the former hemisphere wields language with precision;
the words mean something reliably, while the latter assigns meaning to words as it deems fit
(and I think Oliver is generous to say this is done in the spirit of “Truth”). Now, as a professor of
government, I have always felt it important that words mean what they mean, and so it would
seem Oliver might toss me into the right-wing populist milieu. That’s a damn shame. Is there
really no moderate position for people who believe in a little healthy stability of terms?

Lines: 351-372
Oliver’s allegorical plot really reaches its peak in Canto V. I particularly like what seems
to be a critique of liberalism in the Savior of Tradition’s opening statement in a public debate (I
like to think of it as an homage to the great orators of Athens, the first democracy). The
communitarian nature (albeit an exhausting one) of many right-wing populists does often seem
to be a reaction to stifling liberalism. Not all “ideas are of equal weight” and more is not always
more. That seems to come out well in lines 367-72:
There was a time
when the wealth of information
was not all that mattered,
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but the way it was used —
the dreams it drew —
was of concern.
This is a call for civic virtue and better character — to go about personal gain with meaningful
vision. It’s disappointing that such a reasonable statement needs to be delivered by a right-wing
populist leader, whose rhetoric grows more and more hateful.

Lines: 387-395
The populist left does indeed tend to characterize wealthy (and apparently conservative)
individuals as “analytical, conniving, scheming” in its calls for wealth redistribution. Oliver
seems to be doing a fair job here of capturing some of the bite (warranted or not) of leftists. I
worry at times, however, that Oliver actually aligns himself with these dreams, as he
periodically betrays a bit of sympathy, I think.

Lines: 508-534
My last point of interest is Oliver’s mention that the Savior of Tradition has yet to build
any unity, and further, that a path forward actually seems to rest on both hemispheres, or
political sides. It’s true that an election does not somehow fix things. I also agree that the
left-wing populists and the political left as a whole will need to dip into some nuance if they
want things to change. The left must speak in moral terms, admit where the political right
seems justified (throw ‘em a bone), and speak with some real wisdom. Finally, closing a poem
that constantly pulled me in only to elicit a furrowed brow, Oliver rightly says the above solution
begins with listening. What a good lesson this would be for all of us.
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The Second Comment
Simon Gauthier
An anonymous professor at Claremont McKenna College — a school that is as highly-ranked as
it is unknown — reached out to me a few months ago to see what I thought of her undergrad’s
poem. The student, Oliver Wolf, was trying to allegorize the rise and nature of populism
through six cantos for his senior thesis. Now, I’m used to looking for the next great story, but I
usually don’t turn to the cantos of a philosophy, politics, and economics undergrad to find it. I
trusted this professor, though. After all, in an age of fake news, what better way to tell the truth
than through fiction? I took a look through the manuscript on my way to the studio, one hand
coddling the stapled pages and the other clenching a grab handle on the train. Although I,
frankly, can’t say whether Oliver’s work will catch a hold of the public’s attention (and if it does,
whether it will last), I am certain that the young man has made a worthwhile, albeit imperfect,
contribution to the political dialogue of our time.

Lines: 20-27
It’s beautiful to see a young person so free and taking ownership of their place in time.
Through his words, Oliver does strike me as almost overconfident, but his self-awareness and
intentions seem too clear to knock him harshly for it. Everyone has a mic today, so at least he is
trying to say something.
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Lines: 40-44
After discussing politics on major networks nearly everyday for over a decade and
publishing (strictly non-fiction, of course) a few times myself, I can state confidently that our
democracy is truly ill. We are not thinking well as a nation; this is toxic. That said, I would
suggest that it’s okay if we’re not able “to believe, to reflect, to believe as once before” (lines
42-4). It’s okay if we change or evolve, but it must be healthy.

Lines: 61-85
Oliver is right, many of the “dreams” (people) of the “Mind of Demos” (democracy or
community, right?) have lost their voice in this time of big money politics and inaccessible
representatives. A single person’s civic agency has eroded. I think Oliver might be missing
something, however, and that’s the dreams who have never been heard — who never had a
voice. I don’t pretend to know exactly how you fit a history of injustice related to race, gender,
or sexuality into the allegorical world Oliver’s built, and I don’t think the allegory falls too short
with its exclusion, but it’s worth noting nonetheless.

Lines: 97-127
Well, this was awkward. I was quite liking this “Savior of Tradition” and the “Left” until I
reached the xenophobic lines on the “Other Dreams” (immigrants, foreigners) and realized
what I was reading. I quickly understood that the “Left” hemisphere was really the political
right, making the “Right” the political left. This was irritating, because there’s some subtle
psychological commentary that logically follows (the analytical left-brain versus the creative
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right-brain types of people). This made me a little self-conscious and also struck me as
reductive, but then I realized that it was a young poet — a creative — who had set this dichotomy
in his clean allegorical world. This leads me to believe Oliver doesn’t actually believe the political
sides are really this clean cut and this is simply an easy way of parsing out a trend. (Either that,
or Oliver is implicitly admitting his unabashed leftism).

Lines: 154-158
This does look like the kind of manipulation and strategy indicative of right-wing
populist leaders.

Lines: 163-175
I think Oliver is right to observe how the left-wing populists view the youth as “the rising
conscience” of our democracy. This is something I share with the populist left and, frankly,
wish we all could appreciate. The youth aren’t jaded by societal wrongs the way many of us “old”
folk might be. It’s easy to talk about age and tradition, but is it so easy to justify how the length
of a pattern of belief somehow makes it right? With a little more salt than pepper on my head,
I’m not so sure it is.

Lines: 225-253
What an interesting device? A “Book of the Mind of Demos” that transcends physical
space and transmits words throughout? Sounds like social media, which would be quite an
appropriate component of the populist phenomenon to include on Oliver’s part. So much of the
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way we communicate and engage in civic discourse is through a screen now, and the anonymity
of screens has allowed populist rhetoric to run rampant online.

Lines: 268-297
I appreciate Oliver targeting the way the political right and left approach language, as
their incongruence has made for an unhealthy democratic dialogue. I think right-wing
populists (and the political right in general) are wildly too protective of words’ meanings.
Language is a construct; we assigned some words to our world in the past, why can’t we
reassign them now? It is regressive to hold the lives of people — living, breathing people — back
because we refuse to change the language we use around them, to validate them. If the right
wants to talk about using our morals, let’s start with our mouths. In order to treat one another
as we’d want to be treated, we must recognize one another as we recognize ourselves.

Lines: 351-372
This is where the right-wing populist critique of liberalism comes out, and I think it
demonstrates the right’s failure to appreciate how supposedly “amoral” liberalism really
authorizes morality. We can exercise ethical decision-making with more options and freedoms;
liberalism is the freedom to make a choice. Choosing to do a good thing is what makes an action
virtuous, as Adam Smith (of all people) writes in his Theory of Moral Sentiments ( capitalists would
do well to take a break from Wealth of Nations and spend a few minutes in this text...something
to consider).
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Lines: 391-406
Although I disagree with the idea that all the wealthy are “analytical, conniving,
scheming” and conservative as Oliver’s “Savior of Justice” states, I do think we’ve set the youth
up for failure. The “new dreams” (youth) are not prepared to take on “the neurology” (what I
assume represents the financial economy? The economy of ideas?). We’ve made education,
healthy living, and political representation all difficult to access, all while the economy evolves
faster and faster. We obviously need more publicly-supplied job training, free public college
education, and free healthcare. It’s unfortunate that such reasonable steps are only preached by
leftists.

Lines: 508-534
Oliver is right. Despite whatever our elected Savior of Tradition wants to believe, the
country is not united and it seems like Oliver knows that it never really can be under populist
leadership. What does unite us? The very thing that divided us, that is currently infected:
language. We need less “mania in the medium of the Book” and a little more healthy
conversation and reflection. But as much I appreciate Oliver calling on the political left to
practice better listening and healthier dialogue with the right, I think he fails to emphasize
what the right will need to do on its part (this gap makes his prognosis almost sound like
“right-wing esque” victim blaming). Indeed, there must be a little “bravery” and “wisdom” on
the part of conservatives if right-populists are going to change.
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